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Cuno: The Property Tax Issue
EowARD A.

ZELINSKY*

Most discussions of Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc. 1 (including my own)2
have focused on the state income tax credit which Ohio granted to DaimlerChrysler for DaimlerChrysler's new plant in Toledo. In Cuno, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck this income tax credit on dormant Commerce Clause grounds. Less attention has been paid to the municipal personal
property tax exemption also extended to DaimlerChrysler. In contrast to the
Cuno court's conclusion that the Ohio income tax credit is unconstitutional,3
that court upheld the Ohio property tax exemption and rejected the claim that
the exemption unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce.
At one level, the intense focus placed on the Sixth Circuit's treatment of the
Ohio income tax credit is unsurprising because the Sixth Circuit's invalidation
of that credit endangers a widespread network of similar tax credits. Disruption
draws attention. And Cuno, if it accurately states the law under the dormant
Commerce Clause, will disrupt state tax laws and economic development
programs throughout the nation. Those laws and programs typically attract and
retain businesses using the type of income tax credit struck on constitutional
grounds by the Cuno court. The Supreme Court's decision4 to hear the Cuno
case to review the constitutionality of the Ohio income tax credit focuses further
attention upon that credit and its status under the dormant Commerce Clause.
In contrast, the appeals panel's decision sustaining the municipal property tax
exemption reinforces the status quo; i.e., the property tax exemptions routinely
extended to firms like DaimlerChrysler to attract or retain such firms. Moreover,
the Supreme Court has yet to indicate whether it will review the property tax

* The Morris and Annie Teachman Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University. For comments on an earlier draft, Professor Zelinsky thanks Professor Walter Hellerstein.
This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Boris I. Bittker. In the words of the traditional
Jewish prayer of remembrance, "may his place of rest be in paradise."
1. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 36 (Sept.
27, 2005).
2. Edward A. Zelinsky, Ohio Incentives Decision Revisited, 37 ST. TAX NoTES 859 (Sept. 19, 2005),
reprinted in 108 TAX NOTES 1569 (Sept. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Revisited]; Edward A.
Zelinsky, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler: A Critique, 34 ST. TAX NOTES 37 (Oct. 4, 2004), reprinted in 105
TAX NOTES 225 (Oct. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Critique] .
3. The Cuno court's conclusion that the Ohio income tax credit violates the dormant Commerce
Clause is limited to firms like DaimlerChrysler with "pre-existing" presence in Ohio. See Cuno, 386
F.3d at 747.
4. On September 27, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari sought by the
defendants in Cuno to review the Sixth Circuit's decision invalidating the Ohio income tax credit
extended to DaimlerChrysler. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 36 (Sept. 27, 2005).
As part of its September 27th order, the Court requested that the parties brief the issue of the Cuno
taxpayers' standing to challenge the Ohio income tax credit. The Court was divided the last time it
considered state taxpayers' standing to sue in federal court. Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
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portion of the Cuno opinion. 5
It is, however, probable that plaintiffs emulating the Cuno taxpayers will
challenge property tax exemptions in other states. Now pending before the
Wisconsin Supreme Court is a Cuno-style challenge to Wisconsin's personal
property tax exemption for any airline maintaining a "hub facility" in that state. 6
Other courts are likely to address the constitutional status of similar property tax
exemptions in the years ahead.
I accordingly write to help remedy the relative neglect of the Cuno property
tax issue. In particular, I write to explore the contention of the Cuno plaintiffs
that the municipal personal property tax exemption extended to DaimlerChrysler discriminates in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and to examine
the Sixth Circuit's rejection of that contention.
The taxpayers' dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the Ohio property tax
exemption raises three basic issues. Two of these-the equivalence of tax and
direct expenditures for Commerce Clause purposes and the indeterminacy of the
concept of Commerce Clause discrimination-also arise in the context of the
Ohio income tax credit. However, the third issue-the Commerce Clause status
of the conditions attached to the personal property tax exemption-is unique to
that exemption.
My basic conclusion about the DaimlerChrysler property tax exemption is the
same as my earlier conclusion about the Ohio tax credit: it is wrong as a matter
of tax policy but permitted as a matter of constitutional law. A direct expenditure subsidy from Ohio to DaimlerChrysler would have had the same economic
effect on interstate commerce as the tax exemption actually granted. Since the
direct spending subsidy should pass dormant Commerce Clause muster, so too
should the comparable tax exemption. Policies with identical economic effects
on interstate commerce should have the same status for dormant Commerce
Clause nondiscrimination purposes.
I also conclude that, if municipalities proceed with property tax exemptions,
municipalities are, as a matter of policy, well-advised to attach to such exemptions the kind of conditions challenged by the Cuno taxpayers. Such conditions
ensure that municipalities actually receive the performance promised by the
firms subsidized by tax exemption. Such conditions thus constitute a reasonable
quid pro quo for the subvention entailed in tax exemption. The dormant
Commerce Clause has not and should not be interpreted as precluding such quid

5. The Supreme Court has yet to act on the certiorari petition of the Cuno taxpayers. That petition
asks the Court to review the Sixth Circuit's opinion sustaining the municipal personal property tax
exemption granted to DaimlerChrysler for its new Ohio plant. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cuno v.
DaimlerChrysler, Inc., No. 04-1407 (Apr. 18, 2005) [hereinafter, Taxpayers' Petition].
6. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't. of Revenue, No. 04-0319, 2005 WL 487882 (Wis. Ct.
App. Mar. 3, 2005) (dormant Commerce Clause challenge to personal property tax exemption certified
to Wisconsin Supreme Court). The considerations leading me to conclude that Ohio's personal property
tax exemption constitutes bad tax policy but is constitutional lead me to the same conclusions about the
Wisconsin exemption.
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pro quo conditions when a state or locality subsidizes a business firm via a cash
grant, favorable loan, in-kind service or other nontax assistance. Consequently,
the dormant Commerce Clause should pose no barrier to such conditions when
a state or locality subsidizes through an economically equivalent tax break.
In the final analysis, there is no principled basis for declaring the Cuno
property tax exemption discriminatory for dormant Commerce Clause purposes
while an economically equivalent direct expenditure subsidy passes Commerce
Clause muster.
BACKGROUND

As readers of the now-extensive Cuno oeuvre7 know, DaimlerChrysler replaced its existing manufacturing plant in Toledo with a new nearby facility. For
this new plant, DaimlerChrysler received an investment tax credit against
DaimlerChrysler's Ohio income tax liability. In addition, as part of Ohio's
enterprise zone program, DaimlerChrysler received for this new plant a ten year
exemption from municipal personal property taxes.
To retain its property tax exemption, DaimlerChrysler was (and is) obligated
under Ohio law to make a stated level of investment and to maintain employment in the new plant at specified levels. If DaimlerChrysler fails to satisfy
these obligations, the property taxes forgiven by the exemption become payable
retroactively and the exemption can also be withdrawn prospectively. 8
The Cuno plaintiffs did not (and do not) contend that personal property tax
exemptions per se violate the dormant Commerce Clause: "[T]he Commerce
Clause would raise no barrier against a state granting a general exemption from
personal property taxation for all business property, or for certain categories of
personal property, located within the state. " 9 Rather, the Cuno plaintiffs argued
before the Sixth Circuit and assert in their petition for certiorari that the
conditions Ohio attaches to such property tax exemption (commonly called
"clawback" provisions) 10 cause the exemption to discriminate against interstate
commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause: "It is these conditions
upon the granting of tax exemptions"-the requirements that DaimlerChrysler

7. See, e.g., Chris Atkins, Ohio Investment Credit Decision: A Pyrrhic Victory for Economic
Neutrality, 2005 ST. TAX TODAY 107-21 (June 6, 2005); David Brunori, The Politics of State Taxation:
Helping States to Hun Themselves, 2005 ST. TAX TODAY 107-5 (June 6, 2005), excerpted in 107 TAX
NOTES 1442 (June 13, 2005); Jennifer Carr & Cara Griffith, The Legal Front: Litigation and Tax
Incentives After the Downfall of Ohio's ITC, 2005 ST. TAX TODAY 83-5 (May 2, 2005); Robert J.
Firestone, State Investment Tax Credits Do Not Violate The Dormant Commerce Clause, 2005 ST. TAX
TODAY 73-3 (Apr. 18, 2005); Michael Mazerov, The Ohio Investment Credit Decision: Modest But
Helpful "Anns Control" in the "Economic War Between the States," 2005 ST. TAX TODAY 53-1 (Mar.
21, 2005); Erika Lunder, CRS Analyzes Impact of Cuno Decision on State Tax Incentives, 2005 TAX
NOTES TODAY 130-10 (July 8, 2005); Robert D. Plattner, The Vantage Point: Cuno Confinns Constitutional Infirmity of Many State Business Tax Incentives, 2004 ST. TAX TODAY 225-6 (Nov. 22, 2004).
8. OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§§ 5709.62(C)(l), 5709.631 (2005).
9. Taxpayers' Petition, supra note 5.
10. See infra, note 31 and accompanying text.
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make a specified investment and maintain minimum levels of employmentwhich "impose[] unconstitutionally 'discriminatory burdens.'" 11
In support of their position, the Cuno plaintiffs analogize the Ohio personal
property tax exemption extended to DaimlerChrysler to the Maine property tax
exemption struck on Commerce Clause grounds by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison. 12 The Maine exemption
was conditioned upon a nonprofit summer camp serving Maine, rather than
out-of-state, children. The Court held that on its face the exemption, "discriminates against interstate commerce" by "singling out camps that service mostly
in-staters for beneficial tax treatment, and penalizing those camps that do a
principally interstate business." 13
On two grounds, the Sixth Circuit sustained the Ohio property tax exemption
against the Cuno plaintiffs' dormant Commerce Clause challenge. First, the
appeals panel characterized the conditions Ohio attaches to the property tax
exemption as "minor collateral requirements," which "are directly linked to the
use of the exempted personal property." 14 Consequently, the requirements that
DaimlerChrysler make a specified investment and employ a minimum number
of persons "do not independently burden interstate commerce." 15
Second, the Sixth Circuit held the property tax exemption "non-coercive." 16
The Ohio income tax credit is unconstitutional, according to the appeals panel,
because the credit "reduces pre-existing income tax liability." 17 In contrast, "the
personal property exemption does not reduce any existing property tax liability."18 Rather, "[t]he exemption merely allows a taxpayer to avoid tax liability
for new personal property put into first use in conjunction with a qualified new
investment." 19 Hence, according to the Sixth Circuit, the personal property tax
exemption (unlike the Ohio income tax credit) does not discriminate against
interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
Finally, the Cuno court distinguished Camps Newfound/Owatonna because
the Ohio property tax exemption at issue in Cuno (in contrast to the Maine
exemption) does not restrict "the individuals employed or served" by the
institution receiving the exemption. 20
On September 27, 2005, the Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in
Cuno challenging the Sixth Circuit's decision that the Ohio tax credit violates
the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court has not acted on the certiorari

11. Taxpayers' Petition, supra note 5.
12. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
13. Id. at 576.
14. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 747 (6th Cir. 2004).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. This implies that the credit is permitted to a firm (unlike DaimlerChrysler) with no prior
presence in Ohio. See Zelinsky, Revisited, supra note 2; Zelinsky, Critique, supra note 2.
18. Cuno, 386 F.3d at 747.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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petition of the Cuno taxpayers which asks the Court to review the constitutional
·status of the municipal personal property tax exemption.
DISCUSSION

a) The Equivalence of Tax and Direct Expenditures
Like their challenge to the Ohio investment tax credit, the challenge of the Cuno
taxpayers to DaimlerChrysler's property tax exemption highlights a fundamental
problem with the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence concept of discrimination:
the economic and procedural equivalence of tax and direct expenditures. The Court's
case law holds that tax and direct outlays are, for dormant Commerce Clause
purposes, different when in fact such taxes and direct outlays may be identical in their
economic effects and procedural characteristics. 21
Suppose, for example, that, in lieu of the personal property tax exemption
granted to DaimlerChrysler, the Ohio municipalities had instead fully taxed
DaimlerChrysler's new facility, but had simultaneously given to DaimlerChrysler a cash grant equal to the property taxes paid by DaimlerChrysler. Suppose
further that this cash grant was (like the property tax exemption) conditioned on
DaimlerChrysler both making a specified level of investment and maintaining a
minimum level of employment at the new facility.
The economic consequences of this theoretical direct cash grant wo1.i.ld be precisely
the same as the economic effect of the property tax exemption actually extended to
DaimlerChyrsler. The Supreme Court has stated that the fundamental inquiry under
the dormant Commerce Clause is the "actual effect" of a state's tax policies upon
interstate commerce.22 From this premise, if the property tax exemption is constitutionally infirm because of its economic ramifications, the comparable cash grant must
similarly violate the dormant Commerce Clause because of its equivalent economic
effects on interstate commerce.
Or suppose that, in lieu of the personal property tax exemption actually
extended to DaimlerChrysler, the Ohio municipalities had granted to DaimlerChrysler a no-interest loan of equivalent economic effect to the property tax
exemption. Again, let us assume that this loan was, like the property tax
exemption, conditioned on DaimlerChrylser's satisfaction of minimum investment and employment targets. If the dormant Commerce Clause is about "actual
effect," this hypothetical no-interest loan must have the same constitutional
status as the economically comparable property tax exemption. Both impact
interstate commerce in the same way.

21. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the ComtMrce Clause: The Case for Abaruwning
the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 Omo N.U. L. REv. 29
(2002) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Abandoning]; Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally
Equivalent to Direct Expenditures," ll2 HARV. L. REv. 379, 400-12 (1998) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Tax
Benefits].
22. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756 (1981); see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977).

124

THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW

& PuBuc POLICY

[Vol. 4:119

Or, to take yet a third variant, suppose that the Ohio municipalities had levied
full property taxes against the new DaimlerChrysler plant, but had provided
DaimlerChrysler with in-kind services (e.g., worker training, roads, sewers) of
equal value to the exemption. Again, if compliance with the dormant Commerce
Clause is a matter of "actual effect," in-kind services provided by state and local
governments can have the same economic impact as tax incentives.
Procedurally, a similar story of equivalence can be told. 23 Sometimes, tax
expenditures require an affirmative vote by politically accountable decision
makers. At other times, tax expenditures are structured as pre-existing entitlements for which the taxpayer is automatically eligible if the taxpayer satisfies
stated criteria. The same is true of direct outlays, such as grants, loans, and
in-kind services. Sometimes, politically accountable decision makers must vote
to extend these outlays to a particular taxpayer. In other cases, permanent
entitlement-type programs dispense direct outlay largesse automatically to any
taxpayer who satisfies pre-established criteria.
In Cuno, the property tax exemption extended to DaimlerChrysler required
the affirmative agreement of the affected municipalities, the City of Toledo, and
two school districts.24 So too equivalent grants, loans or in-kind services might
have required explicit approval of municipal decision makers. In short, taxes
and direct outlays may be equivalent in their procedural characteristics as well
as their economic effects.
The equivalence of tax incentives and direct outlays has sobering implications for the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause analysis: if, as current
doctrine holds, 25 it is the Court's role under the dormant Commerce Clause to
police state tax policies for their discriminatory economic effects against interstate commerce, the Court should also police substantively and procedurally
equivalent direct expenditures for their discriminatory economic effects. If the
Commerce Clause can be violated by one, then logically it can be violated by
the other.
The problem is not one of borderlines and close cases. Rather, at the core of
the concept of dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination, there is no principled basis for distinguishing between taxes and direct expenditures. If, as the
Cuno plaintiffs contend, the personal property tax exemption given to DaimlerChrysler discriminates against interstate commerce, so too would a procedurally
and substantively comparable direct outlay.
This, quite understandably, is a conclusion from which many (myself
included) recoil since it would intrude the Court and the dormant Commerce
Clause deeply into the routine spending decisions of states and localities.

23. Zelinsky, Tax Benefits, supra note 21, at 400-09.
24. Cuna, 386 F.3d at 741-42.
25. Nondiscrimination is one of the four elements of the widely applied Complete Auto test.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 277-78. For a description and critique of the Court's dormant
Commerce Clause case law on nondiscriminatory taxation, see Zelinsky, Abandoning, supra note 21, at
32-47.
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Given, on the one hand, the equivalence of tax expenditures and direct
spending, and, on the other hand, a dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence based on "actual effect," it is difficult to find any state or local outlay
immune from the charge that it favors in-state over out-of-state interests in
violation of the nondiscrimination test of that Clause. By definition, state
and local spending benefits persons within the state's or locality's boundaries to the exclusion of those outside.
Suppose, for example, that local officials had determined that DaimlerChrysler was more likely to invest in a new Toledo facility if magnet high schools
were established in Toledo. Suppose further that, in response to this insight,
such schools were created and, as had been hoped, DaimlerChrysler located its
new plant near its old Toledo facility. If (as the Cuno plaintiffs assert) a property
tax exemption inducing DaimlerChrysler to build in-state can violate the nondiscrimination requirement of the dormant Commerce Clause, so too the dormant
Commerce Clause must apply to this affirmative expenditure of public funds
which constitutes a similar inducement to DaimlerChrysler to build in Ohio.
"Actual effect" must mean "actual effect," whether the policy causing the effect
on interstate commerce is a tax subsidy or a direct expenditure.
To summarize: unless we are prepared to apply the dormant Commerce
Clause concept of nondiscrimination to virtually all expenditures of state and
local governments, there is no principled basis for policing tax exemptions
which are procedurally and economically equivalent to such direct expenditures.
b) The Indeterminacy of Commerce Clause Discrimination

Notwithstanding the equivalence of tax and direct expenditures, let us assume
arguendo that there is a persuasive basis for subjecting taxes, but not direct
outlays, to dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination scrutiny. This brings
us to the second question highlighted by the Cuno plaintiffs' challenge to the
DaimlerChrysler personal property tax exemption: is there a convincing basis
for identifying some taxes but not others as discriminating against interstate
commerce?26
The Cuno taxpayers acknowledge the constitutionality of a personal property
tax exemption "for all business property, or for certain categories of personal
property, located within the state."27 In contrast, the Cuno taxpayers condemn
as unconstitutional the exemption extended to DaimlerChrysler because that
exemption is conditioned upon required levels of investment and employment. 28

26. See Zelinsky, Abandoning, supra note 21; Zelinsky, Critique, supra note 2.
27. Taxpayers' Petition, supra note 5.
28. Framing the issue in this fashion ignores an important kind of property tax exemption, an
exemption targeted to a particular firm but lacking any performance requirements. Suppose, for
example, that DaimerChrysler had been voted a firm-specific property tax exemption to stay in Toledo,
but that Ohio law did not condition such exemption upon minimum amounts of investment and
employment. Such a firm-specific exemption would not satisfy Vie Cuno plaintiffs' test for constitution-
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The position outlined by the Cuno taxpayers proves unpersuasive because the
impact of the Ohio property tax exemption on interstate commerce depends
upon the point in the taxpayer's decisionmaking process at which such impact is
assessed. Consequently, the concept of nondiscriminatory taxation proves indeterminate in this dormant Commerce Clause context (as it does in most other
dormant Commerce Clause settings). 29
Because DaimlerChrysler has accepted the Ohio property tax exemption with
its condition of minimum investment and employment levels, DaimlerChrysler,
to retain that exemption, will now assign jobs and investment to its new Toledo
facility rather than send jobs and investment out-of-state and thereby jeopardize
the exemption. If, in contrast, DaimlerChrysler had built a tax-exempted Ohio
facility without conditions being attached to the exemption, DaimlerChrysler
would have been free to move jobs and capital out-of-state without risking its
exemption. Q.E.D., the Cuno plaintiffs conclude, the conditioned Ohio exemption discriminates against interstate commerce by inducing DaimlerChrysler to
keep employment and investment in Ohio rather than sending such employment
and investment out-of-state.
Note the critical, but unstated, premise of this argument: constitutionality
under the dormant Commerce Clause is to be assessed after DaimlerChrysler
has located its new plant. From this vantage, as the Cuno plaintiffs maintain, the
conditions attached to the personal property tax exemption will incent DaimlerChrysler to keep jobs and investment in Ohio to protect the exemption. Indeed,
it is the evident purpose of those conditions to retain employment and investment in Ohio in return for personal property tax exemption.
But a different perspective emerges if matters are assessed earlier in DaimlerChrysler's decision making process, when DaimlerChrysler chose to build in
Ohio rather than elsewhere. At this prior point in the process, the conditions
attached to the Ohio property tax exemption, by inhibiting DaimlerChrysler's
operational flexibility, made it less attractive for DaimlerChrysler to build in
Ohio. The obligations attached to the Ohio property tax exemption incented
DaimlerChrysler to build in another state where property tax exemption is not
tied to specified levels of investment and employment.
Suppose, for example, that DaimlerChrysler had narrowed its choice to two
locations, Ohio and State X. Suppose further that the economics and taxes of
State X were identical to the economics and taxes in Ohio except that State X

ality as this exemption would apply to a single firm, not to businesses generally or to any category of
businesses. At the same time, this kind of firm-specific, but unconditioned exemption would not trigger
the Cuno plaintiffs' test of unconstitutionality since no obligations of employment or investment would
be attached to the exemption.
The Cuno plaintiffs might retort that they are challenging a property tax exemption which in fact
includes investment and employment conditions; they are accordingly not obliged to outline the precise
boundaries of constitutional property tax exemptions. Fair enough. But those evaluating the Cuno
plaintiffs' claims must think about the next case.
29. See Zelinsky, Abandoning, supra note 21 , at 32-47.
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exempts from taxation all personal property of car manufacturers and attaches
no conditions to that tax exemption. On these assumptions, holding all other
factors constant, DaimlerChrysler would have picked State X for its new factory
over Ohio since State X grants property tax exemption with no strings attached
while the Ohio exemption is freighted with investment and employment obligations. Thus, from the point at which DaimlerChrysler made its locational
decision, the unconditioned property tax exemption of State X was more likely
to influence that decision (and thereby alter the pattern of interstate commerce)
than the more constraining exemption offered by Ohio.
In sum, if the impact on interstate commerce is assessed at the time DaimlerChrysler was choosing between Ohio and other locations, the Cuno plaintiffs
have it exactly backward: an unconditioned property tax exemption is more
attractive to a firm than an exemption like Ohio's, burdened with performance
obligations. Consequently, when a firm is deciding where to locate its new
facility, the pattern of interstate commerce is more likely to be altered by a state
which offers a flexible tax exemption than by Ohio which offers an exemption
obligating the exempted firm to meet investment and employment levels to
retain tax-free status.
There is a priori no way to choose if Commerce Clause discrimination
should be assessed before or after DaimlerChrysler decided to locate its new
plant in Ohio, though the outcome of the nondiscrimination inquiry depends
upon that choice. It is no surprise that the dormant Commerce Clause concept of
discriminatory taxation proves indeterminate in the context of the Ohio property
tax exemption as that concept lacks coherence in all but the simplest cases. 30
c) The Clawback Provisions
Having placed aside the equivalence of tax and direct expenditures, let us
similarly bracket the difficulty in the dormant Commerce Clause setting of
distinguishing between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory taxation. This
allows us to examine the third issue raised by the Cuno plaintiffs' challenge to
the DaimlerChrysler municipal property tax exemption: assuming arguendo that
there are principled distinctions to be drawn for Commerce Clause purposes
between tax and direct expenditures and between those taxes which discriminate and those which do not, should, as the Sixth Circuit held, the conditions
placed on the DaimlerChrysler property tax exemption be disregarded?
The kind of conditions attached by Ohio to the municipal personal property
tax exemption are often denoted as "clawback"31 provisions and are increasingly common. The logic of such clawback conditions is straightforward and
compelling: because the state or municipality is subsidizing a business firm via
tax exemption, the subsidizing state or municipality should, in return for taxes

30. See Zelinsky, Abandoning, supra note 21, at 32-47; Zelinsky, Critique, supra note 2.
31. See, e.g., Scott J. Ziance, Making Economic Development Incentives More Efficient, 30 URB.
LAW. 33, 41 (1998) ("a clawback clause operates in the future to recover foregone taxes").
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foregone, be guaranteed promised benefits in terms of investment and employment. A deal is a deal.
The Cuno plaintiffs are evidently opponents of tax subsidies. However, their
litigating posture-unconditioned exemptions are constitutional, constrained
exemptions are not-puts them at loggerheads with those subsidy reformers
who favor clawbacks to assure states and localities tangible benefits in return
for tax exemptions. No doubt, some (likely many) who support the position of
the Cuno plaintiffs do not really favor the unconditioned property tax exemptions characterized as constitutional under this position. Rather, these Cuno
supporters hope that, if exemptions without strings are the only constitutional
alternative, municipalities will abandon exemptions altogether since they can no
longer attach conditions to such exemptions.
This is potentially a high stakes gamble: if, as the Cuno plaintiffs assert, only
unconditioned exemptions are constitutionally permitted, states and municipalities
may be forced to grant tax exemptions without clawback provisions rather than
abandoning exemptions altogether. If this occurs, exemption opponents will have won
what many would consider a Pyrrhic victory as exemptions would still be granted but
without any corresponding obligation by the subsidized business firm.
Critical to understanding the Cuno panel's handling of the clawback issue is
an important article by Professors Hellerstein and Coenen, Commerce Clause
Restraints on State Business Development Incentives. 32 Professors Hellerstein
and Coenen postulate that, for dormant Commerce Clause purposes, the key
difference between an unconstitutional tax incentive and a tax incentive which
passes Commerce Clause muster is "coercion." Under this theory of dormant
Commerce Clause nondiscrimination, "the coercive use of [the state's] taxing
authority" 33 makes a tax provision unconstitutional.
The Cuno panel had a curious relationship with the Hellerstein and Coenen
article and its coercion theory of dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination.
The original version of the Cuno opinion34 contained no references to the
Hellerstein and Coenen article, though the article's coercion theory was central
to that opinion. Indeed, the Cuno panel's analysis of the Ohio income tax credit
is a direct application of that theory: because DaimlerChrysler had prior in-state
presence in Ohio, the Ohio tax credit "pressured" DaimlerChrysler to stay in
Ohio rather than relocate to another state. To its credit, the panel subsequently
revised and reissued its Cuno opinion, 35 acknowledging the influence of the
Hellerstein and Coenen article and its coercion thesis.
However, in upholding against constitutional challenge the conditions at-

32. Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 789 (1996). This article had been cited by the Supreme Court. See
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 591 ( 1997).
33 . Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 32, at 795 .
34. Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 383 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2004) withdrawn and modified by 386 F.3d
738 (6th Cir. 2004).
35. 386 F.3d 738 .
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tached to the DaimlerChrysler municipal personal property tax exemption, the
Cuno panel eschewed the Hellerstein and Coenen coercion framework without
giving an explanation. Professors Hellerstein and Coenen conclude that, under
the dormant Commerce Clause, it is unconstitutionally coercive for a state to
condition a property tax exemption upon the taxpayer's "independent activity. " 36 In particular, Professors Hellerstein and Coenen state that "property tax
incentives limited to businesses that create a certain number of new jobs in the
state" violate the dormant Commerce Clause by using the state's "taxing power
to coerce taxpayers to engage in in-state activity." 37
This describes the Ohio tax exemption, conditioned on DaimlerChrysler
maintaining required employment levels at its new Toledo plant. The Hellerstein and Coenen coercion analysis indicates that such employment-related
clawback provisions violate the dormant Commerce Clause by demanding of
the exempted firm "independent activity" in the form of guaranteed employment levels. Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit, while it chose to follow the
Hellerstein-Coenen coercion theory in the context of the Ohio income tax
credit, abandoned that analysis as to the property tax exemption, upholding the
exemption despite the employment-related conditions attached to it.
The Sixth Circuit never explains why it cherry picks from the Hellerstein and
Coenen article in this fashion, using the article's coercion theory to hold
unconstitutional the income tax credit, but not the property tax exemption. 38
The closest Cuno comes to an explanation for upholding the exemption conditions is Cuno's characterization of the Ohio clawback provisions as "minor
collateral requirements" which "are directly linked to the use of the exempted
personal property." 39
The Cuno plaintiffs are properly critical of this statement. 40 It is, as they
suggest, difficult to see how the employment-related clawback provisions are
either "minor" or "collateral." Rather, those conditions go to the heart of the
deal Ohio and its localities offered to DaimlerChrysler: guarantee Ohio jobs and
pay no personal property taxes.
Similarly hard to understand is the Sixth Circuit's observation that DaimlerChrysler's obligation is "directly linked" to the use of the tax-exempted plan.

36. Hellerstein and Coenen, supra note 32, at 829.
37. Id. at 826-27.
38. One possibility is that the Sixth Circuit simply misread the Hellerstein and Coenen article. The
revised Cuno opinion cites the opening portion of that article in which Professors Hellerstein and
Coenen label as noncoercive and thus constitutional a straightforward property tax exemption. However, the opinion ignores the latter part of the article in which Professors Hellerstein and Coenen
identify as unconstitutionally coercive a property tax exemption tied to requirements such as the
maintenance of in-state employment levels. Compare Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d at
747-48 (citing pages 806-09 of the Hellerstein-Coenen article) with Cuno, 386 F.3d at 826-28.
39. Cuno, 386 F.3d at 747.
40. See Taxpayers' Petition, supra note 5, at 6 n.6 ("The court offered no explanation of why it
characterized Ohio's requirements of agreed levels of investment and jobs as 'minor collateral requirements . ... "').
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This linkage, the appeals court indicates, makes the employment conditions
constitutional. Professors Hellerstein and Coenen, however, come to the opposite conclusion: linking tax exemption to employment levels makes the exemption unconstitutionally coercive under the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Sixth Circuit panel may have had a good reason for treating the Hellerstein and Coenen coercion theory as authoritative as to the Ohio tax credit but
not as to the property tax exemption. If so, that reason does not appear on the
face of the Cuno opinion.
I myself am skeptical of the Hellerstein and Coenen coercion thesis, viewing
it as a skilled, but ultimately unsuccessful, effort to salvage a body of dormant
Commerce Clause case law which cannot be salvaged. 41 Nevertheless, since the
Sixth Circuit embraced that thesis as to the Ohio tax credit, the appeals court
had an obligation to explain its rejection of that thesis as to the personal
property tax exemption.
More persuasive is the Cuno panel's rejection of the asserted similarity of the
Ohio municipal personal property tax exemption to the Maine tax exemption
invalidated in Camps Newfound/Owatonna. Ohio required DaimlerChrysler
neither to hire Ohio residents nor to purchase in Ohio the personal property
installed in the new Toledo plant. Without such requirements, it is difficult to
equate Ohio's exemption with Maine's.
In the final analysis, the equivalence of tax and direct expenditures suggests
the propriety of Ohio's clawback provisions, both as a matter of policy and as a
matter of constitutional law. Suppose, again, that Ohio had given DaimlerChrysler a grant, loan or in-kind subsidy and had attached to that largesse the
requirement that DaimlerChrysler build a Toledo facility and maintain minimum employment levels there.
In this theoretical case, critics would have gained little traction from the
argument that such a nontax subsidy of DaimlerChrysler violated the dormant
Commerce Clause. Similarly, such critics would have mustered little, if any,
support for the contention that this direct subsidy of DaimlerChrysler must, for
Commerce Clause purposes, be shorn of the obligations to build a Toledo plant
and to maintain minimum employment levels there. As a matter of policy, this
nontax subsidy and the conditions attached to it constitute a plausible quid pro
quo, given the premise that subsidization should occur in the name of economic
development. 42
There is, as a matter of policy and constitutional law, no principled basis for
distinguishing between this theoretical direct subsidy to DaimlerChrysler with
its clawback provisions and the economically and procedurally comparable tax
exemption which actually occurred with such provisions attached. The economic effects of the two subsidies are identical. If one is permitted under the

41. Zelinsky, Abandoning, supra note 21, at 70-76.
42. A premise of which I am skeptical as a matter of tax policy, but which I assume for purposes of
this dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
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dormant Commerce Clause, so should the other.
Quite properly, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to extend the dormant
Commerce Clause nondiscrimination principle to direct expenditure subsidies
whether or not conditioned upon the performance of the subsidized firm. It
consequently makes no sense to apply the dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination principle to economically comparable tax incentives freighted with
such clawback conditions.
Thus, my final verdict on the Cuno court's decision upholding against
dormant Commerce Clause challenge Ohio's property tax exemption with its
clawback provision: right result, poorly reasoned.
CONCLUSION

I remain skeptical on policy grounds of the kind of tax incentives extended by Ohio
and its municipalities to DaimlerChrysler. However, that such incentives are unwise
as a matter of policy does not make them unconstitutional as a matter of law. Current
dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination doctrine rests on two untenable distinctions, between tax and direct expenditures and between discriminatory and nondiscriminatory taxation. Ultimately, neither distinction proves coherent.
The economic result Ohio achieved by granting property tax exemption to DaimlerChrysler could alternatively have been accomplished by comparable direct expenditures, whether in the form of grants, loans or in-kind services to DaimlerChrysler.
Thus, despite the analytical weakness of the Cuno opinion, the Sixth Circuit reached
the correct result in sustaining that personal property tax exemption against dormant
Commerce Clause challenge. That exemption had the same economic effect on
interstate commerce as a comparable direct outlay would have had. So far at least, the
Supreme Court has been unwilling (as it should be) to intrude the dormant Commerce
Clause nondiscrimination principle into states' and localities' direct expenditures. It
consequently is unpersuasive to strike on dormant Commerce Clause grounds economically identical tax subsidies, like the personal property tax exemption extended to
DaimlerChrysler.
If states and municipalities can, consistent with the dormant Commerce
Clause, undertake direct expenditures with the "actual effect" of recruiting and
retaining in-state firms, there is no persuasive reason for striking under that
Clause economically comparable tax incentives.
While I am skeptical as a matter of policy of the kind of tax exemption
granted to DairnlerChrysler, if states and municipalities are going to grant such
exemptions, they should attach to such exemptions the kind of clawback
obligations challenged by the Cuno plaintiffs. Such obligations are a reasonable
quid pro quo, once the state or locality has decided to subsidize.
The dormant Commerce Clause has not and should not be construed as
precluding states and municipalities from attaching clawback conditions to
direct subsidies to firms like DairnlerChrysler. There is no principled basis for
treating comparable tax incentives under the Commerce Clause any differently.

